
A Report to the
Citizens of Salt Lake County
The County Mayor and the
County Council

An Audit of Key Controls
at the Millcreek Canyon
Toll Booth



OFFICE OF THE
SALT LAKE COUNTY
AUDITOR

SCOTT TINGLEY
COUNTY AUDITOR

July 2018
Report Number 2018-3

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To foster informed decision making, strengthen the internal control environment, and improve operational efficiency and effectiveness for Salt Lake County, through independent and objective audits, analysis, communication, and training.



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**Office of the
Salt Lake County Auditor
Scott Tingley, CIA, CGAP**

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**An Audit of Key Controls at the
Millcreek Canyon Toll Booth**

We recently completed an audit of key controls at the Salt Lake County Parks and Recreation Division's ("Parks and Recreation") Millcreek Canyon Toll Booth ("MCTB"). The MCTB is managed and operated by the Salt Lake County Parks Operations Office in a partnership with the U.S. Forest Service. The Salt Lake County Parks Operations Office manages group picnic site and winter yurt reservations in the Millcreek Canyon recreation area. County employees at the MCTB collect user fees from hikers, cyclists, campers, and motorists who enjoy the many trails and recreation opportunities that Millcreek Canyon has to offer.

The purpose of the audit was to examine financial transactions and business processes at the MCTB to determine if critical internal controls related to change funds, cash receipts, daily cash deposits, capital and controlled assets, and purchasing cards were properly implemented and functioning as intended. We performed tests of those key controls to provide assurance that accounting records were complete and accurate, financial transactions and processes complied with established policies, procedures, laws and regulations, and that county assets were adequately safeguarded against the risk of loss, theft, waste, or abuse.

Our work was designed to provide reasonable, but not absolute assurance that the system of internal controls was adequate, financial records current, and that daily transactions were recorded accurately. Since our audit included only a sample of items from the period we examined, there is a risk that we would not have discovered problems related to assets or transactions not specifically selected for review.

Audit criteria included the Parks and Recreation Division's own internal policies and procedures, as well as countywide policies such as Countywide Policy 1062, "Management of Public Funds," and Countywide Policy 1125, "Safeguarding Property/Assets." Additional criteria were drawn from the United States Government Accountability Office's ("GAO") Executive Guide, "Best Practices in Achieving Consistent, Accurate, Physical Counts of Inventory and Related Property."

By its nature, this report focuses on issues, exceptions, findings, and recommendations for improvement. The focus should not be understood to mean that

we did not find various strengths and accomplishments at the MCTB. We truly appreciate the time and efforts of the employees of Parks and Recreation, and specifically the employees at the MCTB throughout the audit. Our work was made possible by their cooperation and prompt attention given to our requests.

Scope and Methodology

Our audit covered the period from January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2017. However, the period may have been adjusted to include any relevant information, records, or data from outside this period, as appropriate.

The audit work included an examination of assets, records, and transactions in the following areas:

- Change Funds
- Cash Handling and Daily Deposits
- Capital and Controlled Assets
- Purchasing Cards

In addition to examining financial records, we observed business practices and tested the internal controls surrounding them. We examined daily cash deposits and monthly reconciliations, interviewed employees, physically examined controlled assets, and performed a count of the change fund.

Audit Results

Change Funds

Audit Objectives:

- Determine if the change fund at the MCTB is intact and maintained at the authorized amount.
- Determine if the change fund is properly safeguarded against theft or misuse.

We performed a surprise count of the \$100 change fund at MCTB and found that it was intact and balanced to the correct amount as authorized by the Mayor's Office of Financial Administration ("Mayor's Finance"). We also interviewed the staff at MCTB and observed the change fund balancing procedures, operations, and security.

We observed that only one cashier is on duty at a time and there are two to three cashier shifts per day depending on the time of year. The change fund is retrieved from the safe by the first cashier on duty, passes from one cashier to the next during the day, and then at the end of the final cashier's shift, the change fund is returned to the safe and then locked up.

Findings and Recommendations

Finding 1.1: The safe was not locked during the day.

During one of our visits to the MCTB, we found the safe was not locked. When we questioned the cashier on duty as to why the safe was not locked, she explained that it was too difficult to open throughout the day.

Countywide Policy 1062, *“Management of Public Funds,”* in the *Purpose* states:

“The objective of the policy is to provide effective safeguards, while weighing both the risks to be mitigated and the cost of maintaining controls.”

Section 2.3, *Physical Security of Public Funds*, states:

“The County Agency’s Fiscal Manager will ensure that individual accountability and effective security is maintained for funds entrusted to each Cashier . . .”

Ensuring the physical security of cash is a critical internal control intended to prevent and deter theft. If a portion of the change fund or cash receipts are kept in the safe throughout the day at MCTB, but the safe is not locked, the physical security that the safe provides is completely defeated, and provides an opportunity for the cash in the safe to be stolen if the cashier leaves the toll booth or becomes distracted.

Keeping County funds and cash receipts locked in a safe while not actively using the funds greatly diminishes the risk of theft. As the cashier that we interviewed stated, it may create a slight inconvenience to keep the safe locked during the day. However, the cashier at MCTB was not aware of the need to keep the safe locked when not actively retrieving or adding to the contents.

Recommendation

We recommend that cashiers at MCTB keep the safe closed and locked at all times during the day whenever funds are stored inside.

Finding 1.2: Management at the MCTB could not provide any evidence that cashiers had attended mandatory cashier training.

We found that MCTB management did not have a process in place to ensure that cashiers had attended mandatory cashier orientation or provide documentation to verify that cashier training had occurred.

Countywide Policy 1062, Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 state:

“At regularly scheduled times as determined by the Treasurer, or as requested by County Agency Management, the Treasurer will provide oversight for the process of training newly designated Cashiers. The Treasurer or his designees will also be available to provide ongoing assistance to Cashiers regarding day-to-day issues. Newly appointed Cashiers, within a reasonable timeframe, shall read through this policy, attend the Cashier Orientation, and report completion to their Supervisor.”

Because of the recent retirement of the prior manager of the toll booth and the lack of any documentation to prove that cashiers had attended the mandatory training, we were unable to determine if any official cashier training had occurred. Cashier orientation classes cover important topics, including county policies and standards for handling cash transactions, ensuring proper segregation of duties, and physically safeguarding cash receipts and change funds.

When cashiers do not attend the cashier orientation classes, and cashier supervisors do not have a process in place to make sure that cashiers are trained properly, then this creates a liability for the County, and a risk that cashiers may not understand county policies and procedures for the proper handling of cash transactions.

Recommendation

We recommend that MCTB management document that training materials have been provided to new cashiers and retain an acknowledgement by cashiers that they have received the training and include the date the training occurred.

Finding 1.3: The substitute form that MCTB was using to document the transfer of the change fund to and from the safe each day was inadequate and did not fully capture the information required on the official MPF Form 7.

We found the *Change Till Daily Balance Sheet* form that MCTB was using as a substitute for the MPF Form 7, *Fund Transfer Ledger*, was not adequate and did not properly document the removal of the change fund from and return to the safe. The purpose of a *Fund Transfer Ledger*, or similar log, is to document that the change fund is maintained at the authorized amount each time that the fund is removed from and returned to the safe, and to establish personal accountability for the change fund, while the fund is in use. By signing the *Fund Transfer Ledger*, an employee is attesting that all funds are accounted for, and that proper custody of the funds is maintained while they are not stored in the safe or lockbox.

We noted that there were two versions of the *Change Till Daily Balance Sheet* being used at MCTB. Based on our review, the *Change Till Daily Balance Sheet* form did not clearly indicate which cashier was removing the change fund from the safe or returning the change fund to the safe each day. In addition, the substitute form did not provide a place to document the counting of the change fund and sign-off when the change fund was transferred between cashiers during a shift change.

Countywide Policy 1062, Section 2.7.3 states:

“Cashiers shall sign an MPF Form 7, Fund Transfer Ledger, or similar log, each time they retrieve the change fund from the safe or lockbox; and return the fund to the safe or lockbox.”

Management at the MCTB had not taken the necessary steps to ensure that the substitute *Change Till Daily Balance Sheet* form adequately captured all of the necessary information required on the official MPF Form 7, before implementing its use at MCTB.

A *Fund Transfer Ledger* is a key internal control that helps minimize the risk of theft or loss of county funds. Without a *Fund Transfer Ledger*, personal accountability for the change fund is not established, and increases the risk that theft or misuse of the change fund could occur and not be prevented or detected.

Recommendation

We recommend that management at MCTB redesign the substitute *Change Till Balance Sheet* form to include the same details as the official MPF Form 7 and increase accountability each time the change fund is transferred during a shift change and retrieved from or returned to the safe.

Cash Handling and Daily Deposits

Audit Objectives:

- Determine if cash handling and daily depositing procedures comply with Countywide Policy.
- Determine if daily cash collections and deposits are properly safeguarded against theft or misuse.

Our audit examined whether daily collections, cash handling, and depositing procedures at MCTB complied with Countywide Policy 1062. The toll booth cashiers take payments for daily and season passes from people in motor vehicles exiting Millcreek Canyon. The toll booth cashiers also prepare a daily deposit for their own collections at the end of each shift. An armored courier service picks up the daily deposits which are sealed tamper-evident deposit bags.

We tested a sample of 30 days of cash and check deposits, that included a total of 72 individual daily deposits. We examined the *Cash Balance Sheets*, the point of sale cash till balance report, and bank statements. We noted that all the deposits were made and received at the bank in a timely manner and were properly safeguarded against theft or misuse.

Findings and Recommendations

Finding 2.1: Voided transactions were not handled in accordance with Countywide Policy.

In our sample of 72 individual daily deposits, we identified 11 voids totaling \$184.00 in the point-of-sale (“POS”) system that did not have evidence of a supervisor’s review. Three of the 11 voids did not have a corresponding void slip with the cash balance sheet. Eight of the 11 voids did have a void slip with an explanation for the void and the cashier’s signature; however, there was no supervisor signature as evidence of review. Findings relating to the handling of voids were also reported in the audits conducted in December 2013 and December 2014 for the MCTB.

Countywide Policy 1062, Sections 3.7.2 and 3.7.3 state:

“The cashier initiating the voided transaction will document, on the front of the voided receipt, the cause of the voided transaction and its resolution. ... A supervisor who was not involved with the transaction will review and sign one copy of the voided receipt, along with the cashier who initiated the void. All voided receipts will be attached to the daily cash balance sheet for audit purposes.”

Management at MCTB either did not educate cashiers on the proper procedures for handling voided transactions or did not enforce the policy as it is written. Voiding cash transactions is one way that theft of funds can be concealed, unless there are adequate separation of duties, and the voids are reviewed and approved by a supervisor who is independent of the process. When voided transactions are not properly reviewed and approved by a supervisor according to Countywide Policy, it creates an opportunity for county funds to be stolen, without being detected.

Recommendation

We recommend that cashiers fill out void slips for every voided transaction, and that a supervisor reviews the reason for the void and signs as evidence of review. MCTB management should ensure that copies of all void slips are kept and attached to the daily cash balance sheet for audit purposes.

Finding 2.2: An inventory and reconciliation of the annual passes was not being performed.

We found that an inventory reconciliation/log is not maintained to enable verification that the number of annual passes sold to patrons agrees to the number of passes issued, and that the remaining number of passes on hand is accurate. There are two types of annual passes sold at MCTB. The senior annual pass sells for \$20 and the regular annual pass sells for \$40.

We were told that only a limited amount of the annual pass hanging tags are kept at the toll booth and the balance of the hanging tags are kept at the Parks Operations office. Additional tags are delivered to the toll booth as needed.

We found that management at MCTB did not keep an inventory of new tags that are brought to the toll booth to replenish tags that had been sold, or compare the number of tags left on hand to the number of tags sold to ensure that tags were not being given away for free. Because there is not an inventory reconciliation for the annual passes, it is difficult to determine if theft is occurring and/or a loss of revenue.

The ***United States General Accounting Office, Executive Guide, (2002), “Best Practices in Achieving Consistent, Accurate, Physical Counts of Inventory and Related Property” Page 5***, states:

“The ability to accurately count physical inventories is critical in verifying that inventory actually exists, and that on-hand balances agree with financial and logistical records.”

Keeping a count of the number of annual passes received and then comparing the number of annual passes on hand to the number of tags sold is a critical internal control procedure designed to both prevent and detect theft. Without a periodic inventory count and reconciliation of the annual passes to determine if any losses are occurring, loss of revenue and/or theft may go undetected.

Recommendation

We recommend that management at MCTB conduct a monthly inventory reconciliation of the annual passes and compare the number of passes on hand with the number of passes sold.

Finding 2.3: The spreadsheet that MCTB was using to track cash overages or shortages did not allow supervisors to sign-off on the form as evidence of a supervisor's review.

We examined a sample of 72 daily deposits and identified 42 cash deposit overages or shortages in the sample. The 42 cash overages or shortages were traced to a spreadsheet document created by the manager at MCTB. However, the overages/shortages were not listed by individual cashiers as the official MPF Form 11 *Cash Over/Short Log* is designed to do.

Because the spreadsheet that MCTB uses to record and track cash overages and shortages does not indicate the name or identification of the cashier responsible for each over/short, it is impossible for a supervisor to determine if an unusual pattern of overages and shortages is occurring with daily deposits, which could be an indication of theft. Excessive shortages could also become a significant loss of revenue over time if patterns are not discovered and corrected. We also found no evidence, either in the spreadsheet or elsewhere, that a supervisor was reviewing the over/short log and signing-off on the review as required by county policy.

Countywide Policy 1062, Section 5.3, "*Resolution of Overages/Shortages*," states:

"All overages and shortages, regardless of the amount, should be recorded daily by each Cashier on MPF Form 11, Cash Over/Short Log. When a significant shortage or a pattern of shortages occurs in the accounts of any Cashier, Agency Management shall conduct an investigation of the circumstances. . . . The MPF Form 11, for each Cashier, shall be signed by the Cashier's immediate supervisor."

The current manager of the MCTB was unfamiliar with the processes that may have been used in the past regarding cash overages and shortages and was only able to provide the spreadsheet cash over/short log. The Parks Administration Office was not able to provide any additional information regarding the way the overages and shortages were being documented and reviewed at MCTB.

Excessive cash overages or shortages could be an indication of manipulation of daily deposits to conceal theft. When overages and shortages are not sorted and recorded daily by the cashier, supervisors could have a hard time identifying unusual patterns, or an excessive number of cash overages and shortages attributed to a specific employee. Without a review of overage and shortage patterns of cashiers by supervisors, then County funds could be at a greater risk of being stolen or misappropriated.

Recommendations

1. We recommend that an over/short log be designed for use by the MCTB so that the supervisor may identify any patterns of overages and shortages by each cashier.
2. We recommend that the cashier and supervisor sign the cash over/short log to indicate that it has been properly reviewed.

Finding 2.4: Management at the MCTB was not reconciling the daily master balance sheet to the bank deposit slip, as required by county policy.

We examined a sample of 72 daily deposits and could not find evidence that management was comparing the total cash deposit amount on the daily master balance sheets to the bank deposit receipt slips to confirm that all cash receipts had been deposited in the bank. Currently, the cashiers at the MCTB track daily deposit totals in a spreadsheet. However, there is not a way for a supervisor to indicate that each daily master balance sheet total was reconciled to the deposit slip total in the spreadsheet as required by county policy.

Countywide Policy 1062, Section 4.2.2, *“Depositing Procedures,”* states:

“The 'master' balance sheet shall be reviewed and reconciled to the bank deposit slip, and signed by another employee designated by Agency Management; and if possible, by an individual with equal or higher authority than the individual who prepared the deposit.”

Reconciling master balance sheet totals to deposit slip totals is a critical internal control intended to mitigate the risk of theft of county funds. Without evidence that management at the MCTB are performing this reconciliation, such as the supervisor’s signature and date that the reconciliation was performed, it is likely that management would not be aware of any discrepancies in a timely manner. For the purposes of the audit, we could not substantiate whether this critical reconciliation was being performed at MCTB. In our opinion, management at MCTB should include a place for a supervisor to sign and date the master balance sheet to indicate that the totals from the balance sheet matched the deposit slip.

Recommendation

We recommend that the MCTB management add a line to the master balance sheet for the manager or another cashier to sign as an indication of review and reconciliation as required by county policy.

Capital and Controlled Assets

Audit Objectives:

- Determine if capital and controlled assets are identified accurately, physically present, and accounted for properly.
- Determine if capital and controlled assets are properly safeguarded against loss, theft, or misuse.

The audit included an examination of capital and controlled asset management at MCTB. Countywide Policy 1125, “*Safeguarding Property/Assets*,” provides guidance and establishes the policies and procedures for the proper management of County capital (“fixed”) and controlled assets, including procedures for accounting for, protecting, and disposing of those assets.

We determined that MCTB had no capital assets. Capital assets are defined as those individual items owned by the County meeting the criteria for capitalization. Currently, only individual items with a cost of \$5,000 or greater meet the criteria for a fixed asset.

Countywide Policy 1125 defines a *controlled asset* as an item of personal property having a cost of \$100 or greater, but less than the current capitalization rate (\$5,000 or greater). Due to their nature, controlled assets are more susceptible to theft, or conversion to personal use than other types of assets.

We obtained a current copy of MCTB’s controlled asset listing from the Parks Operation Office. The list indicated that MCTB only has five controlled assets that are physically located at the toll booth. We noted that the controlled asset list did not indicate when the last controlled asset inventory was performed at the toll booth. We also found that the list had not been updated to include several items that meet the definition of a controlled asset that were found on-site.

Findings and Recommendations

Finding 3.1: The *Controlled Asset Inventory Form – Organization* had not been updated to include several additional controlled assets found on-site and did not indicate when the last controlled asset inventory was performed.

We obtained a controlled assets inventory spreadsheet from the Parks Operations Office for the MCTB. We noted the controlled asset inventory spreadsheet included other Parks and Recreation facilities and had a date of April 1, 2018. The spreadsheet listed only five controlled assets that were currently assigned to the MCTB.

We attempted to locate and identify all five of those controlled assets according to the spreadsheet. Our audit objectives were to determine if those controlled assets were physically present and accounted for, identified properly, and if MCTB had adequate safeguards in place to prevent theft, waste, or abuse of those controlled assets. During our review, we found the following:

- **Two out of the five controlled assets listed on the controlled asset spreadsheet were missing.** A total of five controlled assets were supposed to be at the MCTB according to the list we were provided. However, we were only able to locate and properly identify three out of the five items. The two assets we could not locate from the list were a magstripe reader and a HP printer.
- **Seven other items were found on-site that were not listed on the controlled asset spreadsheet.** Through observation we discovered seven items that fit the definition of a controlled asset that were not included on the controlled asset list we were provided. We found a safe, a computer, a UPS, a portable server cooling unit, small fridge, small microwave, and a locked Great Lake Case with unknown contents.
- **The controlled asset inventory spreadsheet did not indicate when the last controlled asset inventory was performed.** Although the spreadsheet had a date of April 1, 2018, we found no evidence of when the last controlled asset inventory was conducted at the MCTB, or any evidence of a supervisor's review of the results of the inventory as indicated by a supervisor's signature.

Countywide Policy 1125, Section 4.3, states:

"The Property Manager shall maintain records to manage controlled assets using the following forms (or forms that contain substantially the same information) and procedures . . . Exhibit 4 – 'Controlled Assets Inventory Form – Organization' is used for property not readily assignable to an individual employee or which is shared by more than one employee."

The current Manager at the MCTB was not able to find any additional controlled asset documentation maintained by the previous toll booth Manager. Maintaining a current and accurate controlled asset inventory list is an internal control intended to properly identify and account for county assets that are more susceptible to theft or diverted to personal use. In addition, performing periodic inventories of those assets is an essential process to ensure that all controlled assets that have been assigned to the MCTB are physically present, and properly safeguarded against theft, waste, or abuse.

Recommendations

1. We recommend that MCTB management update the controlled asset spreadsheet to include the additional items identified during the audit and maintain an accurate and complete *Controlled Assets Inventory Form - Organization* form.
2. We recommend that MCTB management conduct a controlled asset inventory at least annually, and sign and date the inventory list as an indication that the results of the inventory have been reviewed.

Purchasing Cards

Audit Objectives:

- Determine if purchasing card purchases are appropriate and comply with countywide policies.
- Determine if purchasing cards are adequately safeguarded against loss, theft, or misuse.
- Determine if purchasing card transactions are properly reviewed and authorized by management.

Countywide Policy 7035, *“Purchasing Cards Authorization and Use,”* establishes a set of guidelines for the use and acquisition of purchasing cards (“p-cards”) including how to obtain a card, how to use it, safeguards, unallowable purchases, credit limits, record keeping and reconciliation, audits, and contact information if the card is lost or stolen.

We found that the MCTB Manager was authorized to have a p-card. The Manager works at the Parks Operations Office and had other duties and responsibilities within Parks and Recreation. We found that the actual purchases she made that were allocated to the toll booth were minimal (about \$393) compared to her total p-card expenditures during the audit period. We also determined that two other Parks and Recreation employees had made p-card purchases that were allocated to the toll booth that totaled approximately \$544.

Due to the insignificance of the total p-card purchasing activity of \$937 for the one-year audit period and the reasonableness of that amount for supplies and small expenses, we did not examine those purchases in depth.

Findings and Recommendations

We noted no significant findings in the area of purchasing card transactions and use.

Conclusion

We appreciate the time spent by the Parks and Recreation staff at the Millcreek Canyon Toll Booth answering our questions, gathering the necessary documentation and records, and allowing us access to the toll booth and Park Operations Office during our audit. The staff were friendly, courteous, and very helpful throughout the audit process. We trust that implementation of these recommendations will provide for more efficient operations and better safeguarding of County assets. Please feel free to contact our office if you have any further questions.

Sincerely,



Scott Tingley, CIA, CBAP

Salt Lake County Auditor

Cc: Holly Yocom, Department Director, Department of Community Services
Martin Jensen, Division Director, Parks and Recreation Division
Wayne Johnson, Associate Division Director – Parks, Parks and Recreation Division
Beth Harrell, Millcreek Canyon Toll Booth Manager/Fiscal Coordinator, Parks and Recreation Division

Attachment A: Agency Response

Attachment A: Agency Response

Agency Response Millcreek Canyon Toll Booth

Finding 1.1: The safe was not locked during the day.

Recommendation(s)	Agree/ Disagree	Action Plan	Target Date
We recommend that cashiers at MCTB keep the safe closed and locked at all times during the day whenever funds are stored inside.	Agree	Implemented on June 4th, reiterated to staff closing the door is mandatory. In order to help with the “hard to open” comment, we constructed a platform approximately 16” high so those with a limited range of motion can more easily access the safe door.	6/4/2018

Finding 1.2: Management at the MCTB could not provide any evidence that cashiers had attended mandatory cashier training.

Recommendation(s)	Agree/ Disagree	Action Plan	Target Date
We recommend that MCTB management document that training materials have been provided to new cashiers and retain an acknowledgement by cashiers that they have received the training and include the date the training occurred.	Agree	On June 21, 2018 five of MCTB staff attended cash handling training presented by the Treasures Office. This was the first training available after the audit results. The remained of MCTB staff are scheduled to attend training on August 16, 2018.	8/16/2018

Finding 1.3: The substitute form that MCTB was using to document the transfer of the change fund to and from the safe each day was inadequate and did not fully capture the information required on the official MPF Form 7.

Recommendation(s)	Agree/ Disagree	Action Plan	Target Date
We recommend that management at MCTB redesign the substitute <i>Change Till Balance Sheet</i> form to include the same details as the official MPF Form 7 and increase accountability each time the change fund is transferred during a shift change and retrieved from or returned to the safe.	Agree	Revised and implemented on May 17, 2018 with input and review from Mayor's Finance.	6/21/2018

Finding 2.1: Voided transactions were not handled in accordance with Countywide Policy.

Recommendation(s)	Agree/ Disagree	Action Plan	Target Date
We recommend that cashiers fill out void slips for every voided transaction, and that a supervisor reviews the reason for the void and signs as evidence of review. MCTB management should ensure that copies of all void slips are kept and attached to the daily cash balance sheet for audit purposes.	Agree	Implemented May 17, 2018, every deposit is reviewed for compliance.	5/17/2018

Finding 2.2: An inventory and reconciliation of the annual passes is not being performed.

Recommendation(s)	Agree/ Disagree	Action Plan	Target Date
We recommend that management at MCTB conduct a monthly inventory reconciliation of the annual passes and compare the number of passes on hand with the number of passes sold.	Agree	Annual pass logbook created showing date sold, pass number, and who sold it is now standard procedure and implemented May 17, 2018.	5/17/2018

Finding 2.3: The spreadsheet that MCTB was using to track cash overages or shortages did not allow supervisors to sign-off on the form as evidence of a supervisor's review.

Recommendation(s)	Agree/ Disagree	Action Plan	Target Date
1. We recommend that an over/short log be designed for use by the MCTB so that the supervisor may review any patterns of overages and shortages by each cashier.	Agree	Implemented May 3, 2018, reviewed weekly.	5/3/2018
2. We recommend that the cashier and supervisor sign the cash over/short log to indicate that it has been properly reviewed.		Manager signs every daily deposit sheet.	

Finding 2.4: Management at the MCTB was not reconciling the daily master balance sheet to the bank deposit slip, as required by county policy.

Recommendation(s)	Agree/ Disagree	Action Plan	Target Date
<p>We recommend that the MCTB management add a line to the master balance sheet for the manager or another cashier to sign as an indication of review and reconciliation as required by county policy.</p>	<p>Agree</p>	<p>Revised to include Manager signature and implemented May 3, 2018.</p>	<p>5/3/2018</p>

Finding 3.1: The *Controlled Asset Inventory Form – Organization* had not been updated to include several additional controlled assets found on-site and did not indicate when the last controlled asset inventory was performed.

Recommendation(s)	Agree/ Disagree	Action Plan	Target Date
<p>1. We recommend that MCTB management update the controlled asset spreadsheet to include the additional items identified during the audit and maintain an accurate and complete Controlled Assets Inventory Form - Organization form.</p>	<p>Agree</p>	<p>Controlled and fixed asset inventory sheets for MCTB now segregated from Parks lists.</p>	<p>5/17/2018</p>
<p>2. We recommend that MCTB management conduct a controlled asset inventory at least annually, and sign and date the inventory list as an indication that the results of the inventory have been reviewed.</p>	<p>Agree</p>	<p>Inventory listed segregated, MCTB manger will verify assets and sign annually.</p>	<p>5/17/2018</p>